Resource-rich states frequently underperform on human development despite ample fiscal potential—an empirical pattern widely described as the “resource curse.” Libya represents an extreme case of hydrocarbon dependence coupled with post-2011 institutional fragmentation, volatile budgeting, and weak accountability This paper develops a comprehensive research framework derived from a systematic literature review, synthesizing resource-curse theory, institutional economics, and human capital development scholarship. We investigate why hydrocarbon revenues often fail to translate into effective education investment in fragile contexts. The review identifies four recurring mechanisms: Dutch Disease, rent-seeking, fiscal volatility, and skills mismatch. Building on institutional conditionality arguments, the paper advances a governance-threshold model in which resource revenues yield positive education returns only when governance quality exceeds a minimum institutional threshold. We propose testable propositions and an implementation-oriented education-finance pipeline to locate critical control points, concluding with governance-first implications for sequencing reforms in resource-dependent states
https://doi.org/10.65723/RMSP12545